Volume 42
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 42,
1937-1938
1-1-1938

Aggravated Assaults
Henry S. Machmer

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Henry S. Machmer, Aggravated Assaults, 42 DICK. L. REV. 86 (1938).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol42/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Robbery, like other crimes, is composed of two elements, a physical element
and a mental element. An essential factor of the mental element is an intention
to steal. 5 No physical acts done without this intention can constitute robbery or
an attempt to rob.6 A homicide resulting from acts done without this intention
therefore does not occur in the perpetration of or in an attempt to perpetrate
robbery.
The defendant was fighting for his life; he had presented a reasonable contention; he was entitled to a more adequate answer than the laconic statement "it
is immaterial."

W. H.

HITCHLER.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS
In cases of assaults with intent to kill, or with some similar specific intent,
difficult questions arise when the victim is not the person whom the assailant really
desired to injure. This situation is presented in cases of mistaken identity and
in cases of accident.
In cases of mistaken identity as, for example, where A, desiring to kill B,
assaults C, believing him to be B, A is guilty of an assault with intent to kill
C.1 In such cases, there is no need to invoke the doctrine of transferred intent
as is done in some of the decisions. 2
Since the assailant believes the victim to
be the one whom he desires to kill, he desires to kill the victim. Thus, where the
defendant lay in wait for the driver of a milk wagon, believing the driver to be
the one whom he desired to kill when he was actually another, the defendant was
convicted of assault with intent to kill the victim. The court said, "It was not
a mistake as to the intent; it was merely a mistake as to the identity of him as to
whom the intent was harbored. He intended . . . to strike the identical
person whom he did strike believing him to be some other person." 3 In a
similar case of mistaken identity, it was said, "The purpose of the assailant was
to accomplish the end immediately in view, and the actual victim was no less
the intended direct physical object of the attack because at the time he may have
4
been taken for some one else."
In cases of accident, as, for example, where A shoots at B and accidentally
hits C, the statute governing, and the indictment alleging the intent must be con5C. v. White, 133 Pa. 182; Rex v. Hall, 3 Car. & P. 409.
6
Hanson v. S.,43 Ohio St. 375, 1 N. E. 136.
1State
v. Wansong, 271 Mo. 50; 195 S. W. 999.
2
Reg. v. Smith, 33 E. L. & Eq. 567; contra, Rex v. Holt, 7 C. & P. 609.
$State v. Wansong, 271 Mo. 50; 195 S. W. 999.
4
State v. Costa, 95 Conn. 140; 110 A. 875.
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sidered. A is clearly guilty if the statute requires and the indictment alleges an
"intent to kill," merely, and not an intent to kill the person injured.5 Under
thes e circumstances, the intent to kill is proved by showing an intent to kill B.
However, if the statute requires and the indictment alleges an intent to kill
the particular person injured, it would seem that an intent to kill C must be proved.
Accordingly, it has been held that under the provisions of such a statute, there are
two essential elements necessary to constitute the offense; first, that the defendant
shot at C, and second, that hd did so with intent to kill him, and before a conviction can be had upon this charge, it is incumbent upon the state to establish by
proof both elements of the offense. 6 Nevertheless, this doctrine does not uniformly prevail, for at least one jurisdiction has construed such a statute broadly,
saying that the defendant is guilty "where a shot discharged at one injures another who is, at the time, known to be in such position or proximity that his
injury may be reasonably apprehended as a probable consequence of his act; in
which case, the law does not permit such reckless disregard of and indifference
to results to pass with impunity, bu will hold the inteit to have embraced the
victim." 7

Where the indictment alleges but the statute does not require, an intent to
kill the particular person injured, A is guilty. In these cases, the jury is permitted
to find the intent to kill C as charged in the indictment upon proof of an intent
to kill B. 8 The basis for these decisions is that if C were to die from his injuries, A would be guilty of murdering C and that, therefore, A must be held to
have had the intent to commit the greater crime that would have been the result
had C died. 9 As expressed by one court, "It would be a strange perversion of reasoning, for instance, to hold in the present case that, if Edwards had been killed,
the defendant would have been guilty of murder or of murder in the first degree
as determined by his intent to kill Major Gaynor but that such intent is not to
determine his guilt of an assault with such intent."' 1 This view, however, is not
adopted in all jurisdictions. A few states hold that proof of an intent to kill B
will not permit the jury to find the defendant guilty of an assault with intent
to kill C. 11 In these states, it is said that the intent to kill the person injured
must be proved to the full satisfaction of the jury because the intent is the essence
of the crime charged. 12 This latter doctrine is the law of Illinois, but the rule there
is relaxed by a corollary doctrine that "where a person deliberately shoots at one
5

6

State v. Thomas, 127 La. 576; 53 So. 868.

State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202; 97 S. W. 583; Morgan v. State, 13 S. & M. 242 (Miss.).
v. State, 21 Ohio 306.
Walker v. State, 8 Ind. 290; Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333; State v. Gallagher, 85 A. 207
(N.J.); Smith v. State, 95 S. W. 1057 (Texas).
91bid.
10State v. Gallagher, 85 A. 207 (N.J.).
11Scott v. State, 49 Ark, 156, 4 S. W. 758; Jones v. State, 251 S. W. 690 (Ark.) ; People v.
Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403; People v. Bollman, 163 N. E. 437 (Ill.).
12Jones v. State, 251 S. W. 690 (Ark.) ; People v. Bollman, 163 N. E. 437 (Ill.).
7
Callahan
8
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person and in the direction of another who is wounded by the shot, an intention to
kill the latter is established, although no actual malice or ill feeling toward him
is shown, aid a conviction may be had of an assault upon the injured person with
intent to kill and murder him; as the malice requisite to murder is presumed,
where the proof is that the act was committed deliberately and was likely to be
attended by serious consequences. '"1"
Most of the cases on this subject do not treat th question expressly as a
matter of pleading, but where the question has been so treated, the court has held
that the intent to kill the person injured ,must be proved as alleged in the indict4
ment.'
The prevailing view, then, is that in cases of assault requiring a specific intent
it is no defense that the victim is not the person whom the assailant desired in fact
to injure. The only exceptions are in cases of accident where the statute of the
jurisdiction expressly requires an intent to kill the very, person assaulted, and, in
a few states, where the statute does not require, but the indictment alleges such
intent.
HENRY S. MACHMER.

THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF A PERFORMING ARTIST la
A French writer has declared recently that "when the dramatic author writes a
play, when the composer finishes the score of an opera or a symphony, when
the cinema writer completes a scenario, and when the words or notes have been
placed upon paper, actually printed, and the work corrected and issued, the aim
of the author has not yet been fulfilled if the play, the opera, the symphony or the
scenario is not performed."...
"Itis the actor, the singer, the dancer, the
performer, who, as veritable animators of the author's thoughts, create through
their sensibility and their intelligence the expressive power without which the
public would not be moved."'
What are the legal rights of these "performing artists," the artists, actors,
or performers who interpret the poet's thoughts, bring to life the dramatist's
conceptions, animate for us the scenarist's vision, or express the sentiments noted
on the score of the composer? Has a "performing artist" a legal right, under any
'IPeople v. Cohen, 137 N. E. 511 (WI1.)
4
1 State v. Shanley, 104 N. W. 522 (S.D.)
laFor a complete discussion of this topic see Nathan Bass, Interpretative Rights of Perform.
ing Artists, page 57 of this issue.
IR. Homberg, Le Droit d'Interpretation des Acteurs et des Artistes excutantants. Translated

by Maurice J. Speiser.

